St. John's Law Review
Volume 5
Number 1 Volume 5, December 1930, Number 1

Article 22

Crimes--Murder--Whether a Confession is Voluntary is a Question
of Law (People v. Barbarto, 254 N.Y. 170 (1930))
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

RECENT DECISIONS
competent as tending to show preparation and thus bearing upon
premeditation and guilt. 7 The defendant, by offering himself as a
witness, subjected himself to interrogation as to any vicious or criminal act of his life for the purpose of impeaching his character and
credibility as a witness. 8 Where his credibility is assailed by compelling him upon cross-examination to give testimony which, although
competent for the purpose of impeachment, is collateral to the main
issue, the prosecution, at whose instance the collateral evidence was
elicited, is bound thereby and has no right to contradict it. 9 It is
then the province and duty of the trial court to clearly state the
limitations of the scope of such evidence and the application to be
observed by counsel and jury. 10
In the circumstances of this case, the dissenting opinion questions whether the evidence, even if technically objectionable, so influenced the jury against the defendant that justice requires a new
trial, and expresses the view that whether the defendant had one
weapon or a dozen would not materially change the nature of his
offense. As pointed out by the prevailing opinion, however, it is
essential, in order to assure to a defendant a fair trial, that wellestablished principles regulating the orderly procedure of trial be
observed, for the question of whether a guilty man goes free or not
in a criminal prosecution is a small matter compared with the maintenance of those principles which safeguard a person accused of
a crime.
R.L.

CRIMES-MURDER-WHETHER A CONFESSION IS VOLUNTARY IS

LAw.-Defendant was convicted of murder in the
first degree. Prosecution relied on defendant's confession to establish his guilt. The defense was an alibi and convincing evidence was
offered to show that the confession was entirely involuntary and
extracted by means of threats and severe physical violence. This evidence was only partially denied and wholly uncontroverted. The
question on appeal was whether, where the weight of the evidence is
that the confession is involuntary, the jury should be left to determine
whether the confession was voluntary. Held, reversed. People v.
Barbarto, 254 N. Y. 170, 172 N. E. 458 (1930).
The practice of forcing confessions from defendants in criminal
actions, or the commonly-called "third degree" has been a wellA QUESTION OF

"People v. Scott, 153 N. Y. 40, 46 N. E. 1028 (1897); supra Note 1 at

sec. 238.
'People v. Hinksman, 192 N. Y. 421, 85 N. E. 676 (1908); People v.
Webster, 139 N. Y. 73, 34 N. E. 730 (1893).
' Stokes v. People, 53 N. Y. 164, 176. 13 Am. Rep. 492 (1873); People v.
De Garmo, 179 N. Y. 130, 134, 71 N. E. 736 (1904).
"oPeople v. Webster, supra Note 8.
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recognized institution in this country.' Recent decisions of the appellate courts seem to show, however, that it is not so firmly founded.2
It has been defended and advocated on the ground that the state can
in this way obtain a conviction of a defendant 3 which can often be
secured in no other way. It has become difficult to obtain a conviction because the law gives to the defendant the advantages of a fair
trial by jury, the presumption of innocence, the aid of counsel, the
protection of rules of evidence and the benefit of the doctrine of
reasonable doubt.4 This practice vitiates the rights which the Constitution so zealously secures to a defendant. It renders ineffectual
sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure, one of which states that
a defendant may not be forced to testify against himself, 5 and another
which prevents a defendant from entering a plea of guilty to a
charge of murder in the first degree. 6 The prosecution had to prove
the confession voluntary before it could be submitted to the jury. 7
In this it failed. The evidence was overwhelmingly to the effect that
the confession was involuntary.8 No question of disputed facts or
credibility was involved. It was, therefore, the duty of the Court to
determine, as a matter of law, that the confession was involuntary
and to permit it to go to the jury constituted error. In the instant
case the Court leans toward the view of the English courts. 9 The
wonder is not that the Court is now tending to disapprove of and
discourage this procedure but that it has so long survived that it is
yet an important part of prosecution tactics: If the rules of evidence
were strictly adhered to this problem would not arise.
J. M. C.
'People v. Lipsczinski, 212 Mich. 484, 180 N. W. 617 (1920); People v.
Doran, 246 N. Y. 409, 159 N. E. 379 (1927) ; White v. State, 88 Tex. Cr. Rep.
87, 225 S. W. 177 (1920); Karney v. Boyd, 186 Wisc. 594, 203 N. W.
371 (1925).
2 People v. Trybus, 219 N. Y. 18, 113 N. E. 538 (1916) ; People v. Weiner,
248 N. Y. 118, 161 N. E. 441 (1928).
'We cannot describe the defendant as a criminal for that would be pre-

judging him.

' Code of Crim. Proc., sec. 8 (Laws of 1881, ch. 442).
'Ibid., secs. 10, 393.
'Ibid., sec. 332.
7
Ibid., sec. 395.
'Defendant testified that he was alone with police officers for several hours
and that they struck him, knocked him about and threatened him with further

abuse if he did not confess. Upon being arraigned he was so broken he could
not talk and upon being examined by the jail physician his body was found to
be covered with black and blue spots and lumps which might have resulted
from a beating.
'Rex. v. Best, 2 Cr. App. R. 30 (1909); Ibrahim v. Rex, A. C. 599
(1914); Rex. v. Turner, 19 Cr. App. R. 171 (1926).

